State of Utah v. Mark Caldwell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
State of Utah v. Mark Caldwell : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
J. Franklin Allred; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Caldwell, No. 900066 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2463
FAH 
K "'JMENT 
> U 
0 
MO 
>QCKFT NO. • 
STATE OF UTAH, 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MARK CALDWELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 900066-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE OF 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
321 South 600 East. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MARK CALDWELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
: Case No. 900066-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE OF 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
321 South 600 East. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT A POTENTIAL PURCHASER OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE 
CRIMINALLY LIABLE UNDER THE "ARRANGING" 
PROVISION CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1990) 4 
CONCLUSION 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 
1989) 1 
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) 4-6 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App.)* 
cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989) 2 
State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983) 3-4, 6 
State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987) 3, 5-6 
State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989) 1-2 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1990) 1-6 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 11(f) 2 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) 1 
-ii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 900066-CA 
v. : 
MARK CALDWELL, ; Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of the charge of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) and rule 26(3)(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court erroneously dismissed the charge against defendant on the 
ground that a potential purchaser could not, as a matter of law, 
be guilty of arranging to distribute a controlled substance under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
Because the trial court's ruling is strictly a legal 
conclusion, this Court affords it no deference on appeal and 
applies a "correction of error" standard. Provo City Corporation 
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); State v. Wessendorf, 
777 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of statutory provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Mark Caldwell, was charged with arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (R. 7). 
After the State had presented its evidence at trial, 
defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him. The court 
granted defendant's motion and entered a judgment of dismissal 
(R. 56-58; Partial Statement of the Case (hereafter "Statement") 
at 3). Thereafter, the State filed a motion to set aside the 
judgment of dismissal, which the court denied (R. 62-69, 146-48). 
The State now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the facts. On April 20, 
1989, several undercover police officers were at a residence in 
Pursuant to rule 11(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the parties have prepared and submitted to the trial court a 
partial statement of the case for purposes of this appeal. That 
statement, which covers the undisputed facts developed at trial 
and the court's ruling from the bench, should be a part of the 
record on appeal at the time this case is submitted to the Court 
for decision. 
The trial court's ruling from the bench also appears in a 
transcript included as an appendix to the State's motion to set 
aside the judgment of dismissal (see R. 72-86). 
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Salt Lake County executing a search warrant. At approximately 
5:50 in the evening, defendant and a female arrived at the 
residence and knocked on the door. When one of the officers 
opened the door and asked what they wanted, defendant responded 
that he wanted "a half ounce," a request the officer, based on 
his experience with drug transactions, understood to be one for a 
half ounce of cocaine. It soon became apparent that defendant in 
fact desired to purchase cocaine (Statement at 1-2). 
The officer asked defendant if he had the money, and 
defendant gave him a check which appeared to be a tax refund 
check in the amount of $750 and some change. The officer told 
defendant that he could not use the check, to which defendant 
responded that he would go and cash it. When the officer asked 
defendant if he was sure of what he wanted, defendant said, 
"Yeah, a half ounce of cocaine." At that point the officer 
identified himself as a police officer, arrested defendant, and 
seized the check (Statement at 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the instant case, defendant attempted to purchase 
cocaine. Under State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983), and 
State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987), he, as a potential 
purchaser who engaged in the conduct that he did, can be 
criminally liable under the "arranging" provision contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). That provision, as 
construed in Ontiveros and Renfro, logically applies to both 
potential sellers and potential buyers. The trial court 
erroneously concluded otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT A 
POTENTIAL PURCHASER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
CANNOT BE CRIMINALLY LIABLE UNDER THE 
"ARRANGING" PROVISION CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1990). 
The trial court dismissed the charge against defendant 
on the ground that "[n]one of the sections [of the pertinent Utah 
statutes] interdict and prohibit the purchase or attempted 
purchase of drugs if there is no accompanying possession of a 
drug by the purchaser or attempted purchaser." Statement at 3. 
This conclusion failed to take into account several key cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court, which were cited to the court 
by the State in its motion to set aside the judgment (R. 64-69). 
Defendant's attempted purchase of a controlled 
substance clearly violates the "arranging" provision of section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), under which he was charged. That section 
provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for a person to 
knowingly and intentionally "agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance." In State v. 
Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court, 
interpreting the "arranging" provision as it appeared under a 
prior codification (section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)), stated: 
[A]ny witting or intentional lending of aid 
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form 
it takes# is proscribed by the act. 
601 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). That one who attempts to 
purchase a controlled substance can be guilty of arranging is 
supported by State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983) 
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(construing former section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)). There, the 
defendant, upon the request of an undercover officer to purchase 
some marijuana, accompanied the officer to a residence where 
defendant took the officer's $40, went into the residence, 
returned shortly thereafter, and delivered a bag of marijuana to 
the officer. In reversing the defendant's conviction of 
distributing a controlled substance for value and concluding that 
this was instead Ma classic case of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance for value," the Court observed that "[t]he 
evidence only shows that the [defendant] acted as the officer's 
agent in making the purchase from a third party." 674 P.2d at 
104 (emphasis in original). Obviously, if a purchaser's agent 
can be guilty of arranging under these circumstances, the 
purchaser (the principal) also can be guilty of arranging. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990). 
To convict one (including a purchaser) of arranging, 
the state need not prove a completed transaction. As stated in 
Harrison: 
Inasmuch as an actual sale took place in this 
case, it is unnecessary to address the point, 
but it is noteworthy that the offense of 
arranging the distribution for value of a 
controlled substance does not require the 
actual distribution. All that is needed is 
the arrangement for such distribution, 
coupled with knowledge or intent. Evidence 
of an actual sale may be helpful, or even 
necessary, in proving knowledge or intent, 
but sale itself is not an element of the 
offense. 
601 P.2d at 924 n.5. And, the conduct engaged in by defendant in 
the instant case plainly constitutes the crime of arranging. In 
State v. Renfrof 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1987), the Court held that 
-5-
the defendant, a seller, could be found guilty of arranging where 
he "discussed the purchase [of marijuana] with officers, set a 
price for the marijuana, and agreed to make the exchange." 
Defendant's conduct was nearly identical, the only difference 
being that he was on the other end of the transaction. 
When read together, Ontiveros and Renfro support the 
conclusion that a potential purchaser, who engages in conduct 
like that engaged in by defendant, is guilty of arranging under 
section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). The trial court's view that that 
section is directed at sellers only, see Statement at 2-3, 
ignores Ontiveros, where the defendant was specifically 
identified as the purchaser's agent. Indeed, there is no logical 
reason to distinguish sellers from buyers for purposes of the 
crime of arranging; the distribution of a controlled substance 
may be as much arranged by the buyer as by the seller. It is 
difficult to argue that the middleman in a "classic case of 
arranging" who merely brings the buyer and seller together, as 
was the case in Ontiveros and Harrison, is more culpable than the 
potential purchaser who arranges the transaction himself or 
herself. 
In sum, the trial court failed to consider adequately 
the facts and holdings of Ontiveros and Renfro in dismissing the 
charge against defendant. Those cases support an arranging 
charge, even though defendant was a potential purchaser. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's judgment of dismissal. 
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